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THE "SAME ACTOR INFERENCE" IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: CHEAP JUSTICE?
Julie S. Northup
Abstract: In Proud v. Stone, a 1991 age-related employment discrimination case, the
Fourth Circuit established the evidentiary principle that a "strong inference" of
nondiscrimination arises when the same person hires and then fires the plaintiff within a short
period of time. This "same actor inference" has been adopted in varying degrees by six other
circuits. Only the Third Circuit has expressly declined to recognize the hirer-firer relationship
as more than evidence from which the trier of fact may draw a reasonable inference. Courts
invoking the "inference" have extended its applicability far beyond the original context so as
to permit theoretically an inference of nondiscrimination in virtually any set of hire-fire
circumstances. In practice, courts have tended to treat hirer-firer identity as evidence
subordinate or supplemental to other evidentiary and policy considerations. Nonetheless,
mention of the hirer-firer connection almost always accompanies, and in some instances
appears to ensure, a pro-employer outcome. This Comment argues that the same actor
principle's expansion jeopardizes the efficacy of federal anti-discrimination law. Without
clear limitations, the erratic and unthinking application of the "same actor inference" will
discourage plaintiffs with valid complaints from coming forward and may permit employers
to discriminate without adverse consequences.
"[Ajn inference is a working tool, not a synonym for proof"'
"Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination .... But the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency."2
Employment discrimination cases are often notable for the absence of
direct evidence. Instead, both plaintiffs and defendants typically present
circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact must infer whether
an adverse employment action was improperly motivated? The U.S.
Supreme Court has developed a three-part framework to facilitate the
analysis of such circumstantial evidence.4
Into this already complicated evidentiary formula, the Fourth Circuit
has inserted yet another ingredient, holding in Proud v. Stone' that a
"strong inference" of nondiscrimination arises when the same person
1. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979).
2. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 282 ("[S]ince reliable evidence of subjective intentions [of
discrimination] is seldom obtainable, resort to inference based on objective factors is generally
unavoidable.").
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991).
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both hires and fires the plaintiff.6  This "same actor' 7 or "same
decisionmaker" 8 doctrine has been considered by eight circuits and
adopted to some extent by seven.9 Courts have most frequently noted
hirer-firer identity to support the affirmation of summary judgments for
employers in cases involving alleged discriminatory termination. Beyond
this commonality, however, there has been substantial circuit-by-circuit
variation as to if, when, and how the "same actor" connection should be
triggered.
Part I of this Comment places the "same actor inference" in context by
examining the standards and interrelationships of federal anti-
discrimination legislation, inferences, and presumptions. Part II traces
the evolution of the "same actor inference," in theory and in practice,
from its adoption in 1991 through its current application. Part III finds
that the same actor doctrine has been extended dangerously far beyond
its original parameters and urges restraint in its future application.
I. ANATOMY OF AN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION SUIT
A. Statutory Bases for Federal Employment Discrimination Claims
The "same actor inference" typically arises when a plaintiff alleges
employment-related discriminatory treatment in violation of one of three
federal anti-discrimination statutes. The oldest of these statutes, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,10 prohibits discrimination by covered
employers on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin,
in the absence of a defense. The 1967 Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA)" provides similar anti-discrimination
6. Id. at 797-98.
7. Richard T. Seymour & Barbara Berish Brown, Equal Employment Law Update, 14-280 (BNA
Spring 1997); Douglas L. Williams, Burdens of Proof in Disparate Treatment After Hicks, CB03
ALI-ABA 89,93 (1996).
8. 1 Barbara Lindemann & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 609 (3d ed. 1996).
The inference has also been referred to as the "same actor defense." See, e.g., Jay w. Waks & John
Roberti, When Hirer Does Firing, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 9, 1996, at B4.
9. See cases cited infra note 69.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). The "same actor inference" could also arise under
§ 1981, which prohibits race discrimination, inter alia, in employment contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1994); see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 670 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Although two cases alleging Title VII race discrimination have also
alleged § 1981 violations, the "same actor inference" was only raised in discussing Title VII claims.
See Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1167-68 (6th Cir.), amended by 97 F.3d
833 (6th Cir. 1996); Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, 57 F.3d 369,378 (4th Cir. 1995).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
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protections for employees aged forty and over, and the 1991 Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) 2 prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability.
B. Standards for Proving Discriminatory Treatment
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green," the U.S. Supreme Court
established a methodology for analyzing circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory treatment 4 that has been used, with some modifications,
in a variety of contexts, including Title VII, 5  ADA, 16 and ADEA
17
cases.' 8 The Court significantly refined or explained the McDonnell
Douglas analytical framework in two subsequent cases, Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine"9 and St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks.2"
The McDonnell Douglas framework involves three basic steps. The
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case.2 ' The requisites vary with
the type of adverse action alleged. In discharge situations,22 generally the
plaintiff must prove that he or she (1) is a member of a protected group,
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (1994).
13. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
14. This Comment is restricted to "disparate treatment" scenarios involving allegations of
intentional discrimination against protected groups. It does not address "disparate impact" situations,
in which the implementation of facially neutral policies adversely affects protected groups.
15. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
792.
16. See, e.g., Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1997).
17. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993) (stating that McDonnell Douglas
created a "proof framework applicable to ADEA"). But see O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996) (observing that U.S. Supreme Court has "never had occasion to
decide whether that application of the Title VII rule [variation of McDonnell Douglas framework] to
the ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do not contest that point, we shall assume it").
18. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency charged with
implementing employment anti-discrimination legislation, considers McDonnell Douglas applicable
to Title VII, ADA, and ADEA. EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on St Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
405 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 7175, 7175 n.2 (1994).
19. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
20. 509 U.S. 502.
21. Id at 506; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
22. Most disparate treatment employment discrimination suits involve alleged discriminatory
termination. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 984 (1991); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet:
Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2229, 2285 (1995). Plaintiffs have alleged
discriminatory discharge in more than three of every four published circuit cases in which the "same
actor" principle has been considered. See infra Part IHI.B.3.
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(2) was performing satisfactorily at the time of discharge, (3) was
discharged, and (4) was replaced with a person from outside the
protected group.'s Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a
burden not intended to be onerous,24 the defendant must respond by
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its questioned
actions.2 The defendant's burden at this step is also light; all that is
necessary is admissible evidence sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find
in the defendant's favor.26 If the defendant produces a justification, the
plaintiff must persuade the trier of fact that the proffered reason is a
pretext for discrimination." The Hicks Court made clear that to succeed
at trial, the plaintiff must prove not only that the defendant's proffered
reason is false, but also that the true reason was intentional
discrimination.28 Circuits disagree, however, as to whether a plaintiff
must prove intentional discrimination as well as pretext at the summary
judgment stage.29
Courts are not required to adhere strictly to the McDonnell Douglas
structure in evaluating employment discrimination claims.30 The Hicks
Court noted that a factfinder may have sufficient evidence to proceed
directly to the "ultimate factual issue" of intentional discrimination after
the first two steps of McDonnell Douglas have been completed.3,
23. Mark A. Rothstein et al., Employment Law 186 (1994). These requirements are flexible. For
example, even though white persons technically do not belong to a statutorily protected group, Title
VII prohibits racial discrimination in employment against white persons. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). In ADEA cases, the fact that a replacement was substantially
younger than the plaintiff is a more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the fact that the
plaintiff was replaced by someone outside of the protected class of persons over forty years old.
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996).
24. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
25. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
26. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 & n.9.
27. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
A "pretext" is an explanation that is unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
28. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515.
29. For a discussion of various circuit interpretations, see Thomas Duley, Summary Judgment and
Title VII After Hicks: How Much Evidence Does It Take To Make an Inference?, 28 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 261, 279-84 (1994); Tim D. Gray, Employment Discrimination: Summary Judgment and
Rule 301 After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 15 Miss. C. L. Rev. 217, 236 (1993); Jody H.
Odell, Case Comment, Between Pretext Only and Pretext Plus: Understanding St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks and Its Application to Summary Judgment, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1251, 1269
(1994).
30. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519 (noting that McDonnell Douglas scheme was not intended to be
"rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic"). But see id. at 506 (stating that scheme established "an order for
the presentation of proof").
31. Id. at519.
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Accordingly, some circuits have opted to dispense with the McDonnell
Douglas formalities and proceed directly to the "bottom line," requiring
direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive.32
C. The Role of Inferences and Presumptions in Employment
Discrimination
The framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green33
incorporates three distinct yet overlapping evidentiary tools: mandatory
presumptions, permissive presumptions, and reasonable inferences.
Inferences and presumptions are evidentiary practices that allow the
finding of a particular fact or facts ("inferred" or "presumed" facts) when
other facts ("basic" or "predicate" facts) are established.34 A "conclusive
presumption" requires the factfinder to infer the presumed facts,
regardless of the presence or absence of rebuttal evidence,35 whereas a
"mandatory presumption" requires the factfinder to infer the presumed
facts only if the party against whom the presumption is held fails to
produce rebuttal evidence.36 A "permissive presumption" allows, but
does not compel, the trier of fact to infer the presumed facts from the
basic facts without placing any burden on the party against whom the
presumption is held.37 A "reasonable inference" permits the factfinder to
draw any rational conclusion from the evidence as a whole, with no
allocation of burdens.38
32. See Sime v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ. & Colleges, 526 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1975)
(explaining that McDonnell Douglas does not mandate going through three-step "judicial minuet").
The Fourth Circuit has referred to this alternative approach as one applying "ordinary principles of
proof." Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996); see also
Malamud, supra note 22, at 2237 (advocating abandonment of McDonnell Douglas framework in
favor of"holistic" factfinding endorsed by Hicks Court).
33. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
34. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07; Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985); County Court v.
Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979). See generally Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence
§ 301.6 (4th ed. 1996); McCormick on Evidence § 342 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
35. Graham, supra note 34, § 301.6; McCormick on Evidence, supra note 34, § 342.
36. Graham, supra note 34, § 301.6; McCormick on Evidence, supra note 34, § 342; see also Fed.
P Evid. 301 (providing that presumption in federal civil actions imposes on party against whom it is
directed burden of going forward with evidence to meet or rebut presumption).
37. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314; Allen, 442 U.S. at 157; Graham, supra note 34, § 301.7; McCormick
on Evidence, supra note 34, § 342.
38. Graham, supra note 34, § 301.7; McCormick on Evidence, supra note 34, § 342 (labeling such
inference "rational inference").
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Inferences and presumptions play a large role in the McDonnell
Douglas analysis.3 9 Establishing a prima facie case creates a mandatory
presumption of discrimination, shifting the burden of production to
the defendant.4" The defendant's articulation of a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action serves to rebut
the presumption." Thereafter, the trier of fact may infer from the
evidence used to establish the plaintiff's prima facie case, together with
its belief that the defendant's proffered reason was pretextual, that
discrimination did or did not occur.42 This process is equivalent to the
evaluation of a permissive presumption or permissive inference.
Alternately, the factfinder may infer from the evidence as a whole that
discrimination did or did not motivate the adverse employment action,43 a
process equivalent to drawing a reasonable inference.'
The role of a "strong inference" within this framework is not clear.
The U.S. Supreme Court has used the phrase "strong inference" only a
few times in the employment discrimination arena.45 It is difficult to
determine from the opinions whether the Court sees a "strong inference"
as requiring a burden-shifting process. 46 The use of the phrase by the
circuits suggests both mandatory and permissive interpretations.47
39. For a general discussion of the implications of inferences and presumptions in employment
discrimination, see Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward
a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1205, 1221-23 (1981).
40. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
41. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
42. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
43. Id.
44. See generally Computer Identics Corp. v. Southern Pac. Co., 756 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.
1985) (noting that inferences may be drawn from reasoning process or deduced as logical
consequence of evidence).
45. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 n.25 (1979) (remarking that "a strong
inference that the adverse effects were desired can reasonably be drawn" when legislation creates
inevitable or foreseeable adverse effect on identifiable group).
46. In non-employment contexts, the U.S. Supreme Court's use of"strong inference" more clearly
suggests the creation of a rebuttable presumption. See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460
U.S. 693, 701 (1983) (noting that evidence of "strong inference of impermissible motive" created by
employer conduct may be used to draw reasonable inference "even if employer comes forward with
a nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions"); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 593 (1979)
(finding failure ever to choose black grand jury foreperson created "strong inference of intentional
racial discrimination, shifting the burden to the State" to rebut inference).
47. See, e.g., Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 893 (7th Cir. 1996) (observing that
court must take "particular care in evaluating employer's evidence" when "plaintiff has produced
direct evidence supporting a strong inference" of discriminatory retaliation); Mangold v. California
Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that age-related remarks, in
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE "SAME ACTOR INFERENCE"
A. Origination of the Principle: Proud v. Stone
The "same actor" principle was first introduced by the Fourth Circuit
in Proud v. Stone,48 an ADEA case. Plaintiff Proud was hired on the
basis of a written application sent to a U.S. Army division in Germany.49
The hiring official selected him over six younger applicants for the
position of Chief Accountant. Proud's date of birth, indicating that he
was sixty-eight years old, was noted on his employment application.
When Proud arrived in Germany, he agreed to assume temporarily the
responsibilities of an accounting technician who had recently resigned.0
Proud was terminated six months later. The hiring official's stated reason
for terminating Proud related largely to dissatisfaction with Proud's
performance of the accounting technician duties. 1
The district court granted the Army's motion for dismissal at the close
of the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence at trial. 2 The district court
found that Proud failed to present a prima facie case of discriminatory
termination under the McDonnell Douglas analysis53 because his
performance at the time of discharge did not meet the employer's
legitimate expectations. 4 In addition, the district court found no evidence
of discrimination, noting, among other evidence, that Proud's age was
the same at hiring and firing. 5 On appeal, the Army cited an Eleventh
Circuit decision suggesting that hirer-firer identity decreases the
likelihood of discrimination. 6
combination with "other substantial evidence, created a strong inference of intentional
discrimination').
48. 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991).
49. Id. at 796. Defendant Stone was Secretary of the Army and was sued in that capacity. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at797.
52. Id.
53. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text (discussing McDonnell Douglas framework).
54. Brief for Appellee at 9, Proud (No. 90-2443).
55. Id.
56. Id at 13-14 (citing Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure Prods., Inc., 827 F.2d 1493, 1497 (11th
Cir. 1987) (stating that although fact that plaintiff was hired at age 51 and fired at age 53 "would
seem to negate" age discrimination claim, jury could have discounted that factor in reaching verdict
for plaintiff because hirer and firer were not same individual); Bilotti v. Franklin Mint, Inc., 27 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1031, 1035 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (remarking that since employer hired plaintiff at
age 40, "it is just not consistent with reason and common sense" to find age discrimination "several
months later").
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The appellate court agreed that the hirer-firer relationship was
significant. In affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit expressed
thinly-veiled annoyance at "recurrent" allegations of discrimination by
former employees who have been hired and fired by the same
individual.57 Quoting from a Stanford Law Review article, the court
stated:
One is quickly drawn to the realization that "[c]laims that employer
animus exists in termination but not in hiring seem irrational."
From the standpoint of the putative discriminator, "[i]t hardly
makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby
incurring the psychological costs of associating with them), only to
fire them once they are on the job." 8
The court adopted the article's premise as a basis for an even more
broad doctrine: "[I]n cases where the hirer and the firer are the same
individual and the termination of employment occurs within a relatively
short time span following the hiring, a strong inference exists that
discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action taken
by the employer."59
In making this determination, the court focused on the "bottom line"
of intentional discrimination rather than strictly adhering to the
McDonnell Douglas framework, reasoning that strict adherence to proof
schemes should not interfere with early resolution of the "ultimate
question."'  Nonetheless, the court continued, should the McDonnell
Douglas framework be used, the hirer-firer inference would be
appropriate at the pretext stage of the analysis.6'
The court argued that use of the inference would benefit both
employers and older employees.62 The expedited dismissal of unfounded
allegations would promote the interests of the ADEA by overcoming
employer reluctance, due to fear of litigation, to hire older persons.63
Although the court allowed that "egregious" facts might still prove
discrimination or pretext, the court doubted that such evidence would be
57. Proud, 945 F.2d at 796.
58. Id. at 797 (citing Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1017). The footnote accompanying
Donohue and Siegelman's assertion provides examples of discriminatory terminations despite hirer-
firer identity, but dismisses them as unlikely. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1017 n.106.
59. Proud, 945 F.2d at 797.
60. Id at798.
61. Id.
62. Id
63. Id (citing Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1024).
200
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offered very frequently.' Foreshadowing the future breadth of the
doctrine, the court concluded that "employers who knowingly hire
workers within a protected group seldom will be credible targets for
charges of pretextual firing."
65
B. Expansion of the "Same Actor" Doctrine
The "same actor" principle's applicability was quickly extended.
Since the 1991 decision in Proud v. Stone, virtually every subsequent
Fourth Circuit decision has expanded in some significant way upon the
doctrine's original parameters.6 Starting in 1992, other circuits began to
incorporate the Proud reasoning in their decisions.67 Their adaptations of
the rule in many instances also expanded its original boundaries.68 The
following analysis summarizes thirty published decisions in circuits that
have considered the "same actor" principle, dating from Proud in 1991
through October 1997.69
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994) (extending Proud
inference to ADA context, strengthening terminology to "strong presumption" as well as "strong
inference"); Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1993) (extending Proud inference to
reduction-in-force situation, affirming summary judgment for employer).
67. Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1996); Brown v. CSC
Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996); Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 464
(6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 785 (1996); Rand v. CF Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1147 (7th
Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt
Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174-75 (8th Cir. 1992).
68. See, e.g., Bradley, 104 F.3d at 270 (extending same actor inference to any discrimination
plaintiff); Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 464 (holding that short period of time between hiring and firing
was not essential element of same actor inference, and extending same actor inference to all
protected classes).
69. Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 321 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997); Madel v. FCI Mktg., Inc.,
116 F.3d 1247, 1253 (8th Cir. 1997); Miller v. Citizens See. Group, Inc., 116 F.3d 343, 348 (8th Cir.
1997); Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 1997); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep't
Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1997); Bradley, 104 F.3d at 270-71; Jacques v. Clean-up
Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506, 512 (Ist Cir. 1996); Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160,
1167-68 (6th Cir.), amended by 97 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1996); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 804 n.9
(6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 683 (1997); Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d
1328, 1337 (8th Cir. 1996); CSC Logic, 82 F.3d at 658; Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 546
(5th Cir. 1996); Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996);
EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7th Cir. 1996); Wolfv. Buss (Am.)
Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 923-24 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 175 (1996); O'Bryan v. KTIV
Television, 64 F.3d 1188, 1192-93 (8th Cir. 1995); Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60
F.3d 1126, 1130 (4th Cir. 1995); Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 463; Jiminez v. Mary Washington College,
57 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 1995); Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995);
Rand, 42 F.3d at 1147; Serben v. Inter-City Mfg. Co., 36 F.3d 765, 766 (8th Cir. 1994); Tyndall, 31
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1. Protected Class
Although most cases noting the hirer-firer" link-roughly two of
three t-have involved alleged age discrimination, as was the case in
Proud, various circuits have steadily added other classes of
discrimination plaintiffs. In 1994, the doctrine was extended to ADA
cases. 72 The next year, the principle was employed in Title VII gender,
race, and national origin discrimination contexts.73 The rule's application
was extended to all statutorily protected groups that same year.74
2. Nature of Decisionmaker and Plaintiff Identity
While originally restricted to situations in which the same person did
the hiring and firing, the requirement for direct relationships between the
hirer, the firer, and the employee has been significantly loosened. The
Fourth Circuit has indicated that hirer-firer identity is satisfied if the
F.3d at 214; Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 513 (4th Cir. 1994); Mitchell, 12 F.3d
at 1318; LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 847; Brown v. Stites Concrete, Inc., 994 F.2d 553, 568 (8th Cir. 1993)
(en banc) (Loken, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 548 (8th Cir.
1993); Lowe, 963 F.2d at 174; Proud, 945 F.2d at 797-98. These 30 cases resulted from a Westlaw
search of post-Proud decisions using the keywords "same actor," "same decisionmaker," "discrim!,"
"Proud v. Stone," and "Tyndall," supplemented by circuit-by-circuit searches using the keywords
"same," "discrim!," and case names of prior decisions within each circuit The author conducted the
last set of searches on November 4, 1997; related cases published on Westlaw after that date are not
included in this analysis.
70. In this analysis, the term "hirer-firer" includes individuals who have previously hired or
promoted plaintiffs and later laid off, terminated, or failed to promote plaintiffs.
71. Of 30 cases in which the same actor relationship has been considered, the relationship has
been raised under the ADEA in 18 cases, Title VII in seven, the ADA in two, both the ADEA and
Title VII in two, and both the ADA and Title VII in one. ADEA cases include Madel, 116 F.3d
1247; Miller, 116 F.3d 343; Grossmann, 109 F.3d 457; Rothmeier, 85 F.3d 1328; CSC Logic, 82
F.3d 651; Haun, 81 F.3d 541; Wolf, 77 F.3d 914; O'Bryan, 64 F.3d 1188; Waldron, 56 F.3d 491;
Rand, 42 F.3d 1139; Serben, 36 F.3d 765; Birkbeckl 30 F.3d 507; Mitchell, 12 F.3d 1310; LeBlanc,
6 F.3d 836; Stites Concrete, 994 F.2d 553; Johnson, 994 F.2d 543; Lowe, 963 F.2d 173; and Proud,
945 F.2d 796. Title VII cases include Nieto, 108 F.3d 621; Thurman, 90 F.3d 1160; Evans, 80 F.3d
954; Our Lady of Resurrection MeL Ctr., 77 F.3d 145; Amirmokri, 60 F.3d 1126; Buhrmaster, 61
F.3d 461; and Jiminez, 57 F.3d 369. Jacques, 96 F.3d 506, and Tyndall, 31 F.3d 209, are ADA cases;
Faruki, 123 F.3d 315, and Hartsel, 87 F.3d 795, involve both Title VII and ADEA claims; and
Bradley, 104 F.3d 267, involves both Title VII and ADA claims.
72. See Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 214; see also Harvey Basil, Current Developments in the Law, 4 B.U.
Pub. Int. L.J. 482,487 (1995) (explaining how same actor inference has affected outcome of Tyndall
and other ADA cases).
73. Amirmokri, 60 F.3d 1126 (national origin); Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d 461 (gender); Jiminez, 57
F.3d 369 (race and national origin).
74. Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 464. A year later, the Ninth Circuit similarly found the rule applicable
to any "discrimination plaintiff." Bradley, 104 F.3d at 270.
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same company was involved in both decisions." The Fourth Circuit has
further suggested that a direct relationship between the individual hirer
and the plaintiff is not necessary to establish the inference so long as the
firing official has hired others in the plaintiff's protected class. 76 The
Fifth and Eighth Circuits have applied the rule when there have been
multiple decisionmakers or when there has been ambiguity as to whether
the same individual was involved in both actions."
3. Nature ofAdverse Employment Action
Three in four decisions citing or applying the Proud inference-
twenty-three of thirty cases-have involved alleged discriminatory
terminations such as that claimed in Proud.78 About one-third of these
claims (eight) disputed the employers' assertions that the terminations
were necessitated by economic downturns or reductions-in-force.79 In
1996, the hirer-firer relationship was raised in failure-to-promote
circumstances"° as well as in a failure-to-hire situation in which the
75. Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1130; see also Wolf, 77 F.3d at 923-24.
76. Birkbeckl 30 F.3d at 513.
77. Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 1997). Although Nieto had disputed
the identity of the hirer and firer, see Brief for Appellant at 11, Nieto (No. 96-50419), the employer
argued that "corporate decisions are often made by management groups." Id. at 21; see also Lowe v.
J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir. 1992) (considering evidence that "same people"
or "same company officials" hired and fired plaintiff in less than two years "compelling... in light
ofthe weakness of the plaintiff's evidence otherwise"). But see Madel v. FCI Mktg., Inc., 116 F.3d
1247, 1253 (8th Cir. 1997) (declining to infer nondiscrimination when derogatory comments made
by plaintiff's supervisor could have influenced employer's decision to fire plaintiff).
78. Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 321 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997); Madel, 116 F.3d at 1253;
Miller v. Citizens Sec. Group, Inc., 116 F.3d 343, 348 (8th Cir. 1997); Nieto, 108 F.3d at 624;
Grossmann v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1997); Bradley, 104 F.3d at
270-71; Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1337 (8th Cir. 1996); Brown v. CSC
Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996); Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir.
1996); EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7th Cir. 1996); Wolj, 77
F.3d at 923-24; O'Bryan v. KTIV Television, 64 F.3d 1188, 1192-93 (8th Cir. 1995); Buhrmaster,
61 F.3d at 463; Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995); Rand v. CF Indus.,
Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994); Serben v. Inter-City Mfg. Co., 36 F.3d 765, 766 (8th Cir.
1994); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 1994); Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at
513; Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1318 (4th Cir. 1993); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins.
Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993); Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 548 (8th Cir.
1993); Lowe, 963 F.2d at 174.
79. CSC Logic, 82 F.3d 651; Haun, 81 F.3d 541; Wolf, 77 F.3d 914; Waldron, 56 F.3d 491;
Serben, 36 F.3d 765; Birkbeck, 30 F.3d 507; Mitchell, 12 F.3d 1310; LeBlanc, 6 F.3d 836.
80. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 683 (1997); Evans v.
Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996); Amirmokri, 60 F.3d 1126.
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plaintiff had formerly been employed as a casual worker." That same
year, the First Circuit considered hirer-firer identity in evaluating an
ADA failure-to-accommodate charge.82
4. Hire-Fire Interval
The interval between the hiring and firing decisions, required by the
original Proud decision to be "relatively short,"83 or "several months,"84
has, in many instances, been years rather than months," and in one case
exceeded seven years. 6 The identified interval between hiring, transfer,
or promotion and the adverse employment action was less than one year
in only ten of the thirty cases,87 and two decisions failed to note a time
interval.88 The Sixth Circuit has held that a short period of time between
hiring and firing is not essential, at least in cases in which the plaintiff's
class does not change between the two events. 89
5. Presumptive Implications
Evidence concerning hirer and firer identity, when recognized, has
been labeled differently among the various circuits and within circuits
81. Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160 (6th Cir.), amended by 97 F.3d 833 (6th
Cir. 1996).
82. Jacques v. Clean-up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506 (1st Cir. 1996).
83. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796,797 (4th Cir. 1991). Proud's hire-fire interval was just over four
months. Id. at 796-97.
84. Id. at 796.
85. See, e.g., Grossmann v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457 (8th Cir. 1997) (four years);
Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996) (four-plus years).
86. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, Buhrmaster v. Ovemite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461 (6th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 785 (1996) (No. 95-6699). However, Buhrmaster had been
promoted three years before termination. Id. at 3. In failure-to-promote cases, some courts have
measured the interval from the date of a prior promotion by the same official. See, e.g., Hartsel v.
Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 804 n.9 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 683 (1997).
87. Madel v. FCI Mktg., Inc., 116 F.3d 1247 (8th Cir. 1997); Jacques, 96 F.3d 506; Thurman v.
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160 (6th Cir.), amended by 97 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1996); Hartsel,
87 F.3d 795; Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996); EEOC v.
Our Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1996); Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126 (4th Cir. 1995); Serben v. Inter-City Mfg. Co., 36 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 1994);
Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1993); Proud, 945 F.2d 796.
88. Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1997); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting
Corp., 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994).
89. Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 464 (applying presumption despite seven-year hire-fire interval).
However, the court acknowledged that the strength of the inference varies according to the hire-fire
interval. Id.; cf Hartsel, 87 F.3d at 804 n.9 ("The passage of time between those two [promotion and
failure-to-promote] events is a relevant factor in weighing the inference... ' (citation omitted)).
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over time. The same actor principle has been alternately termed an
"inference," 90 "strong inference,"'9 "powerful inference, 92 "compelling"
inference,93 "presumption,"'94 and "strong presumption."" The First and
Eighth Circuits, while not expressly adopting either an inference or a
presumption, have referred to Proud and its progeny in considering the
evidence as a whole.96 The Third Circuit considered the rule in dicta but
declined to recognize the link as other than evidence from which a
reasonable inference might be drawn.97
In practice, the impact of hirer-firer evidence has ranged from pivotal
to secondary. The hirer-firer connection constituted the "focus" of the
Proud court's "ultimate question" discussion.98 Should the McDonnell
Douglas paradigm be used, the Proud court continued, hirer-firer identity
would be central in establishing the employer's non-discriminatory
motive during the "pretext" analysis.99 In subsequent Fourth Circuit
cases, the linkage sometimes has served to supplement other evidence,' 0
and sometimes has been central to the court's determination.' 0'
90. Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d at 463, 464 n.3 (permitting jury instructions as to "inference" of
nondiscrimination but declining to address propriety of addressing inference as "strong"); Rand v.
CF Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994) (identifying hirer-firer link as among "inferences
that remain"); see also Hartsel, 87 F.3d at 804 n.9 (referring to Buhrmaster's endorsement of "an
inference of a lack of discriminatory animus"); Our Lady of Resurrection Med Ctr., 77 F.3d at 152
(noting recognition of "an inference" in Rand and observing that "same hirer/firer inference has
strong presumptive value").
91. Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1996); Mitchell, 12 F.3d at
1318; Proud, 945 F.2d at 798. The Bradley defendant had advocated adoption of a "powerful
inference." Brief for Appellee at 22, Bradley (No. 95-56003).
92. Evans, 80 F.3d at 959.
93. Proud, 945 F.2d at 798.
94. Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 n.25 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting "the existence of the
Proud presumption, coupled with the insufficiency of the evidence available to rebut that
presumption").
95. Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209,215 (4th Cir. 1994).
96. LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (Ist Cir. 1993); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp.,
Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir. 1992).
97. Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing approvingly Brief of
the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 22-23, Waldron (No. 94-5282)).
Ironically, the EEOC's Office of Federal Operations has itself recognized a "strong inference."
Graham v. Brown, No. 01943193, 1995 WL 618999, at *6 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 17, 1995); Aguiar v.
Browner, No. 01942356, 1995 WL 80049, at *6 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 22, 1995) (citing Burnison v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 01920638 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 27, 1992)).
98. Proud, 945 F.2d at 797-98.
99. Id. at 798.
100. See, e.g., Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996)
(noting "powerful inference ... in addition" to observations that plaintiff's allegations were not
corroborated or supported); Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1130 (4th Cir.
205
Washington Law Review Vol. 73:193, 1998
A circuit-by-circuit examination reveals a comparable inconsistency in
weighing the significance of the hirer-firer relationship, apparently
unrelated to the formal label the circuit has given the hirer-firer
connection. In most instances, the connection has been raised only during
or after consideration of other evidence. 2 Words such as "in
addition, '103 "also,"'114 "moreover,' 0 5 "finally,' '0 6 or "furthermore
' 107
indicate that the connection serves a supplemental function.0 8 In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit has followed Proud's example by raising the
inference prior to the discussion of any other evidence.0 9 The first Eighth
Circuit opinion raising the connection suggested that hirer-firer identity
tipped the scale:
The evidence that plaintiff claims is inconsistent with defendant's
proffered justification is thin, but perhaps sufficient, all other things
being equal, to defeat a motion for directed verdict. In the present
case, however, all other things were not equal. The most important
fact here is that plaintiff was a member of the protected age group
1995) (noting hirer-firer association while pointing out weakness of plaintiff's proffered evidence);
Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, 57 F.3d 369, 381 (4th Cir. 1995) (pointing out "plethora of
information" on which defendant based its justification as compared with plaintiff's "grossly
insubstantial" evidence); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 512-13 (4th Cir. 1994)
(stating-after noting weakness of plaintiff's evidence and defendant's "undisputed" evidence of
economic hardship-that company's "hiring practices make a finding of pretext even less
plausible"); Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1318 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding conclusion of
nondiscrimination "fortified" by inference).
101. Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 1994) (asserting that court
"must focus" on hirer-firer identity in evaluating whether age was one motivating factor).
102. See, e.g., Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1167-68 (6th Cir.) (finding
that inference raised by hirer-firer identity was rebutted by "the sum of the evidence"), amended by
97 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1996); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 802, 804 (6th Cir. 1996) (raising identity
of person who promoted plaintiff in past and did not promote her more recently after noting
plaintiff's "extremely subjective and vague allegations" and "overwhelming" evidence of her lack of
qualifications), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 683 (1997); Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 546 (5th
Cir. 1996) (insisting on considering "evidence as a whole"); Waldron, 56 F.3d at 496 n.6 (noting
agreement with EEOC that hirer-firer identity "is simply evidence like any other").
103. Tyndall, 31 F.3d at211.
104. Thurman, 90 F.3d at 1167; Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996).
105. Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 1997); Rothmeier v. Investment
Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1337 (8th Cir. 1996).
106. EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7th Cir. 1996); O'Bryan v.
KTIV Television, 64 F.3d 1188, 1192 (8th Cir. 1995).
107. Wolf v. Buss (Am.) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 923-24 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 175 (1996).
108. See Miller v. Citizens Sec. Group, Inc., 116 F.3d 343, 348 (8th Cir. 1997) (observing that
"conclusions are further reinforced" by hirer-firer evidence); Rand v. CF Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139,
1147 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting hirer-firer link as among "the inferences that remain").
109. Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267,270 (9th Cir. 1996).
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both at the time of his hiring and at the time of his firing, and that
the same people who hired him also fired him."'
This treatment contrasts sharply with the Eighth Circuit's focus on the
evidence as a whole elsewhere in the same case."'
6. Litigation Phase and Outcome
The Proud court raised the same actor inference in affirming a
directed verdict for the employer issued after the employee had had an
opportunity to present his case."2 In subsequent cases, appellate courts
have employed the doctrine in the contexts of summary judgments,"3
bench decisions, 1"' jury verdicts," 5 and jury instructions.' 16
More than three-fourths of the decisions in which the hirer-firer
relationship has been considered (twenty-three of thirty cases) had pro-
employer outcomes." 7 Nearly two-thirds of the pro-employer decisions
110. Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 175 (finding it "simply incredible, in light of the weakness of plaintiff's evidence
otherwise, that the company officials who hired him at age fifty-one had suddenly developed an
aversion to older people less than two years later") (emphasis added). The court has used or noted
this line of reasoning in Miller, 116 F.3d at 348, Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d
1328, 1337 (8th Cir. 1996), and O'Bryan, 64 F.3d at 1192.
112. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796,797 (4th Cir. 1991).
113. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming summary
judgment for employer).
114. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, 57 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing
district court judgment for employee). On appeal, the defendant criticized the district court's failure
to recognize Proud's applicability. Opening Brief of Appellants at 16-17, Jiminez (No. 94-1776 (L),
94-1802).
115. See, e.g., Jacques v. Clean-up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming district
court's upholding of jury judgment for employer); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507
(4th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's judgment as matter of law that overturned jury verdict in
employees' favor).
116. Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 785
(1996).
117. Miller v. Citizens Sec. Group, Inc., 116 F.3d 343 (8th Cir. 1997); Nieto v. L&H Packing Co.,
108 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 1997); Grossmann v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 109 F.3d 457 (8th Cir. 1997);
Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267 (9th Cir. 1996); Jacques, 96 F.3d 506; Hartsel v.
Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 683 (1997); Rothmeier v. Investment
Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1996); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1996);
Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Our Lady of
Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1996); Wolfv. Buss (Am.) Inc., 77 F.3d 914 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 175 (1996); Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126 (4th Cir.
1995); Buhrmaster, 61 F.3d 461; Jiminez, 57 F.3d 369; Rand v. CF Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139 (7th
Cir. 1994); Serben v. Inter-City Mfg. Co., 36 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 1994); Tyndall v. National Educ.
Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994); Birkbeck, 30 F.3d 507; Mitchell, 12 F.3d 1310; LeBlanc v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (Ist Cir. 1993); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173 (8th
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(fifteen of twenty-three) affirmed summary judgments.' Of the seven
pro-employee decisions, three affirmed bench or jury verdicts for the
employee, 9 and four reversed grants of summary judgment in favor of
the employer. 20 All opinions in the First, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits that raised the hirer-firer connection resulted in pro-employer
outcomes.' 2' Four of the seven pro-employee decisions were issued by
the Eighth Circuit, and one each was issued by the Third, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits.'
22
III. OVEREXTENSION OF THE SAME ACTOR DOCTRINE
The steady expansion of each of the various facets of the original
"same actor inference" suggests that, if unchecked, the hirer-firer
relationship could be recognized to discredit plaintiffs' discrimination
claims in virtually every hire-fire situation. Theoretically, an employee
who was within any protected group at the time he or she was hired, who
remained with the company for an indefinite period of time, and who
then alleged discriminatory treatment could find the standard of proof
significantly altered in the employer's favor. Indeed, in theory the
employee's allegations would be suspect if anyone else in the company
had ever hired anyone else in the employee's protected group.
Despite the potential for misuse of hirer-firer evidence under the ever-
expanding "same actor" standards, courts in practice generally have
considered a host of other factors. Such factors may include evidence of
performance problems," evidence that the hirer belonged to the same
Cir. 1992); Proud, 945 F.2d 796. In Faruld v. Parsons S..P.. Inc., 123 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1997), the
court's decision was pro-employer for two of three claims.
118. Fantd, 123 F.3d 315 (affirming summary judgment for employer against two of three
claimants); Miller, 116 F.3d 343; Nieto, 108 F.3d 621; Bradley, 104 F.3d 267; Hartsel, 87 F.3d 795;
Rothmeier, 85 F.3d 1328; CSC Logic, 82 F.3d 651; Evans, 80 F.3d 954; Our Lady of Resurrection
Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145; Wolf, 77 F.3d 914; Amirmokri, 60 F.3d 1126; Rand, 42 F.3d 1139; Tyndall,
31 F.3d 209; Mitchell, 12 F.3d 1310; LeBlanc, 6 F.3d 836.
119. Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160 (6th Cir.), amended by 97 F.3d 833 (6th
Cir. 1996); Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 1996); Brown v. Stites Concrete, Inc.,
994 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1993).
120. Madel v. FCI Mktg., Inc., 116 F.3d 1247 (8th Cir. 1997); O'Bryan v. KTIV Television, 64
F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1995); Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Group
Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1993).
121. See cases cited supra note 117.
122. See cases cited supra notes 119-20.
123. See, e.g., Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1130 (pointing to plaintiff's "mediocre" performance
ratings).
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protected group as the employee, 2a evidence that the plaintiff's
replacement was also a member of the protected group,1 s and evidence
substantiating the employer's claimed economic difficulties.'26 Other
factors that may be even more predictive of case outcomes include the
composition and proclivities of the particular panel or court;127 the
court's predisposition to granting summary judgment, particularly in
employment discrimination situations; 128 the court's evidentiary standard
for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases; 129 and the
degree to which the court defers to employer business judgment. 30 Given
the multiplicity of other considerations, in most cases the role of the
"same actor inference" in practice has been essentially limited to that of a
permissive presumption, or even a reasonable inference, supplemental to
other evidentiary or policy considerations. Nonetheless, there remain
instances in which hirer-firer identity assumes significantly greater and
arguably undeserved attention, triggering a mandatory presumption, if
not a conclusive presumption, of nondiscrimination. Because the
potential harm resulting from applying the same actor principle far
outweighs its usefulness, the doctrine should be abandoned or limited to
its original parameters.
A. The Same Actor Principle Should Be Abandoned
Perhaps because of its simplicity and appeal to "common sense,"
courts have been quick to apply the Proud doctrine in ever-widening
circumstances, apparently without fully contemplating the ramifications
of such an expansion. A more critical evaluation of the same actor
124. See, e.g., Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996).
125. See, e.g., Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621,623-24 (5th Cir. 1997).
126. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993).
127. Author and practitioner Paul Grossman has commented that "[p]racticing management law in
the Fourth Circuit is like dying and going to heaven." Paul Grossman, Remarks at Pacific Coast
Labor and Employment Law Conference, Seattle, Wash. (May 16, 1997) (notes on file with
Washington Law Review).
128. Some circuits apply special standards for evaluating summary judgment motions in
employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Stewart v. Rutgers, State Univ., 120 F.3d 426, 431 (3d
Cir. 1997) (holding that summary judgment standard "is applied with added rigor in employment
discrimination cases, where intent and credibility are crucial issues") (citing Robinson v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1994)).
129. See supra note 29.
130. Several courts have emphasized that they do not serve as "super personnel departments" and
as such are not charged with second-guessing business decisions. See, e.g., Wolf v. Buss (Am.) Inc.,
77 F.3d 914, 920 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 175 (1996); LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 847.
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doctrine reveals that it was founded on an unsubstantiated assumption
and that its mushrooming application must be stopped.
1. The Presumed Fact of Nondiscrimination Is Not Consistent with
Experience
Numerous examples of situations can be cited in which discrimination
has been found despite hirer-firer identity. '31 Many specific patterns
of discrimination could occur despite hirer-firer identity, including
discrimination associated with "grooming" of other employees,
circumstantial changes, emerging attitudes of hiring officials, and
masked hirer-firer identity.'32
a. Grooming
The Third and Eighth Circuits have recognized that an employer may
hire an older person with the intention of retaining the person only
temporarily.'33 The expertise and experience of the older person could be
used to "groom" a younger person to take over the job. The older person
is, in essence, both hired and fired because of age, contrary to law.
b. Circumstantial Changes
An employee's relationship with the hiring official may change over
time such that the official's decisions are motivated by impermissible
animus. For example, the hiring official may discover a "plus" factor
contributing to a discriminatory decision, such as a female employee is
pregnant134 or has small children.'35 The hiring official may object to
131. See, e.g., Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1167-68 (6th Cir.), amended
by 97 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1996); Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1996).
132. These examples are limited to the termination context.
133. Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Group Health
Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 548 (8th Cir. 1993) (declining to impose inference due to credibility of
using employee's experience during transition period and then terminating her because of age). At
oral argument, Waldron's attorney used President Clinton's then-recent appointment of independent
counsel Lloyd Cutler as an example of how employers might use an older person "to get the house in
order while they're grooming younger people .... He's a valuable 'temp'.... The employer
doesn't want to bring a 25-year-old on, and they don't feel bad about hiring someone just for a short
term, because they're old; they're lucky to have a job at all, from their point of view." Telephone
Interview with Alice W. Ballard, Partner, Samuel & Ballard, Philadelphia, Pa. (Apr. 25, 1997).
134. A similar "sex-plus" situation occurred in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187
(1991) (finding employer's policy of excluding fertile women from jobs exposing them to lead to be
facially discriminatory).
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aggressive behavior by a female or a person of color that would be
tolerated or even lauded if demonstrated by males or white employees. 36
The hiring official may tolerate an employee in an entry-level position
but object to the employee's insistence on being considered for
promotional opportunities and terminate or constructively terminate the
employee as an alternative to promotion.137 In these situations, the
employee or the hiring official's perception of the employee changes
over time, creating unforeseen dynamics.
c. Emerging Discriminatory Attitude of a Hiring Official
A hiring official can develop an aversion to a particular group that was
unrecognized to the official at the time of hire. This is most probable
when the hiring official has not employed many persons from that
protected group in the past. For example, a hiring official may willingly
hire an older person or a female with younger children, but then make
generalizations based on unsatisfactory experiences with those
individuals that convince the hiring official never to hire "one of them"
again.'38 In that manner, a differential standard emerges for people within
the disfavored group. It is ironic that Proud, whose situation generated
the same actor inference, was hired sight unseen. A reasonable trier of
fact could find that the hiring official's age-related prejudices toward
Proud only emerged after the two had met and worked together. 39 The
135. Such a "sex-plus" circumstance occurred in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542,
544 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that gender discrimination may exist where employer barred
employment of women with pre-school children).
136. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234-35, 240 n.6 (1989) (noting employer
resistance to female aggressiveness countering gender stereotypes may constitute "mixed motive"
discrimination); see also Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate
Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1487, 1514 (1996) (remarking that
in such cases of"role-based" discrimination, workers failing to play "assigned" roles on job could be
subjected to discriminatory firing).
137. See Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160 (6th Cir.) (holding that failure to
permanently hire employee employed as casual worker was discriminatory), amended by 97 F.3d
833 (6th Cir. 1996); Brief of Appellant at 15-16, Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d
1126 (4th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-2529) (imploring court not to extend doctrine to promotion scenario
because many employers hire women or minorities for lower-level positions but deny advancement
because of management bias).
138. See Brief of the EEOC as Appellant at 21, EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77
F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2302) (discussing difficulty of ensuring "fair and unbiased
treatment throughout the tenure of employment where daily interactions may exacerbate underlying
biases").
139. Proud's attorney has observed, "You may hire a black person, an older person, but it doesn't
register until you shake hands with them [that you'd rather not be working with them] .... [Hiring
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possible attitudinal shifts call into doubt the conclusion that the hirer and
firer were "the same" in any sense meaningful to the "same actor"
analysis.
d. Masked Lack of Identity of Hirer and Firer
When a hiring decision is made because of pressure from management
or from legal authorities, the hiring official does not have the discretion
essential to be the true "decisionmaker."'4 ° The requirement to make
neutral decisions is less obvious once the hiring has been completed; a
hiring official may feel that it is easier to dismiss a person from a
disfavored group, particularly if the official is simultaneously hiring
members of the same group. For example, a hiring official compelled by
corporate or government policy to hire persons from protected classes
may not perceive the same pressures not to fire an individual
discriminatorily if that person has been "on the books" for some time. 4'
In like manner, the hiring official may hire someone to fulfill affirnative
action goals or to avoid a discrimination suit, but then fire that individual
because the worker does not conform to requirements the employer
imposes only on workers in that group.'42 Similarly, when upper
management instructs someone to fire an individual based on its own
discriminatory animus, the firing official is not the true decisionmaker. 43
A firing official may also make a decision impermissibly based on
perceived customer or coworker discomfort rather than his or her own
is] a different decision [from firing], with different factors." Telephone Interview with Michael J.
Kator, Of Counsel, Kator & Scott, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 19, 1997).
140. See Reply Brief of the EEOC as Appellant at 16, 18, Our Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr.
(No. 95-2302) (observing that "an employer may hire a member of a minority group in part due to
legal or institutional incentives and then hold that person to a higher standard of performance during
the course of employment," and that "legal and institutional incentives for hiring... may
temporarily overcome bias toward certain groups").
141. This example is not dissimilar from one offered in the original article on which Proud relied.
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1017 n.106 (conjecturing that employers wanting to "look
good" on EEOC report might hire employees and later fire them).
142. Donohue terms such employees "coerced hires." Telephone Interview with John J. Donohue
I, Professor, Stanford Law School (Oct. 20, 1997). Waldron's attorney similarly observed that "[i]n
race situations, the employer may say, 'We'll give you a chance, but we know you're going to blow
it."' Telephone Interview with Alice W. Ballard, Partner, Samuel & Ballard, Philadelphia, Pa. (Apr.
25, 1997).
143. This interesting twist on corporate influence was raised in Haynes v. Shoney's, Inc., No. 89-
30093-RV, 1993 WL 19915 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 1993), in which hiring officials were allegedly
pressured by corporate policies to fire persons of color. See Steve Watkins, Racism du Jour at
Shoney's, in Foundations of Employment Discrimination Lmv 135-39 (John J. Donohue I ed.,
1997).
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animus.'" In all such instances, the lack of true identity of the hiring and
firing decisionmakers renders the same actor principle unsuitable.
2. The Same Actor Construct Was Derivedfrom an Unvalidated
Assumption
The unsettled validity of the assumption on which the same actor
principle is based calls into question its widespread adoption. One of the
two co-authors of the article to which the Proud court referred in
announcing the same actor inference confirmed that the statement quoted
in the opinion was not based on empirical evidence.145 Since the
publication of the original article, the co-authors have acknowledged that
prejudice can undermine the rationality of employment decisions.146
Other commentators have come to similar conclusions. 147 In light of the
questionable validity of the inference, courts should doubt the wisdom of
its continued application.
144. See, e.g., Lam v. University of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1560 n.13 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing
that existence of third party preferences for discrimination does not justify discriminatory hiring
practices); Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902, 905 n.5 (11th Cir. 1990)
(noting that employer may not illegally discriminate simply because urged or pressured by third
party); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that
customer preference for female flight attendants does not constitute bona fide occupational
qualification under Title V11). But see EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science Ctr., 710 F.2d
1091, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding age limitation for campus police to be bona fide
occupational qualification because of ability to relate to youthful offenders).
145. Telephone Interview with John J. Donohue IMI, Professor, Stanford Law School (Oct. 20,
1997). In preparing for the article cited by the Proud court, Donohue and Siegelman primarily relied
on a random sample of employment discrimination cases on file in selected federal courts. Their
research focused on explaining a broad pattern of employment discrimination cases (and in
particular, the dramatic shift from failure-to-hire cases to discharge cases) rather than exploring the
relationship between the presence of discrimination and the identity of hirers and firers, which could
not be addressed with the empirical data at hand. Id.
146. See, e.g., Foundations of Employment Discrimination Law, supra note 143 (presenting, inter
alia, excerpts of interdisciplinary research and commentary concerning the nature of prejudice);
Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 136, at 1513-14 (noting phenomenon of "consequential animus," in
which preference of discriminatory employer to inflict harm on disfavored groups can lead employer
to hire and then fire workers from those groups because that would be more hurtful than not hiring
them at all).
147. See, e.g., Susan D. Clayton & Faye J. Crosby, Justice, Gender, & Affirmative Action (1992)
(discussing socio-psychologieal aspects of gender discrimination); Charles R. Lawrence II, The Id
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987)
(discussing socio-psychological aspects of race discrimination).
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3. The Principle as Expanded Is Vulnerable to Abuse
When an unprincipled employer is aware of the legal ramifications of
the same actor construct, artificial identity can be easily created.
14
Employers, once made aware of the Proud principle, will (and should)
take hirer-relationships into account when contemplating termination
decisions. 49 Such advice may lead an unscrupulous employer to create
seeming hirer-firer identity when in fact there is none, a strategy that
might well pass muster with a court ignorant of the details of the
decisionmaking process. There is a serious potential that employers will
manipulate the "facts" and then use the inference to mask a
discriminatory motive. 50
4. The Post-Hicks Analytical Framework Provides Ample Opportunity
for the Trier ofFact To Draw Inferences from Evidence of Hirer-
Firer Identity
The "same actor inference," established prior to St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks,'5' has outlived its usefulness. The Hicks Court
emphasized that the factfinder may decide "the ultimate question" based
on the evidence as a whole. 2 Moreover, the Hicks Court made clear that
at trial the factfinder is under no obligation to render a pro-plaintiff
judgment if the plaintiff substantiates pretext but not discrimination.'53
The factfinder's virtually unlimited ability to draw any reasonable
inferences from the overall evidence obviates the need to create
148. See Elissa Delano Dorfsman, Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc.: Toward an Age of Enlightenment
in Cases of Age Discrimination, 6 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 173, 185 (1997) (noting
employer's ability "to manipulate, redefine, reorganize, dismantle, and resurrect pieces of itself"); cf
Ellen M. Martin, Dispositive Motions in Federal Employment Discrimination Cases, C780 ALI-
ABA 859, 873 (1993) ("When counsel is consulted before the decision is made, counsel has the rare
chance to shape the facts and create the record before litigation is commenced. This is an excellent
opportunity to plan for summary judgment... .
149. See, e.g., Perkins Coie, Ninth Circuit Rejects Discrimination Claim Because Same Manager
Hired, then Fired Employee, Washington Employment Law Letter, Vol. 4, No. 1, at 1 (Feb. 1997)
(observing that Bradley decision is "instructive" to employers who would "be wise to examine
precisely who the hiring and firing decisionmakers were"); Waks & Roberti, supra note 8, at B4
(advising "attorneys for both plaintiffs and defendants" to "heed the importance of the same-actor
inference when preparing their cases").
150. Cf Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (noting temptation for
employers to adopt "surreptitious" quota systems to avoid discrimination litigation).
151. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
152. Id at 518-19.
153. Id at 519.
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evidentiary constructs that draw attention to particular sets of facts. 54
The defendant is free to argue the hirer-firer identity along with other
evidence of nondiscrimination, 5 but the hirer-firer relationship should
not have priority over other types of evidence in this process.
5. The Principle's Application Presents Serious Definitional and
Procedural Concerns
The varied interpretations of the original hirer-firer rule, and
particularly the interchangeability of inferences and presumptions,
provide opportunities for defense attorneys to play fast and loose with
evidentiary terminology and procedure. One defendant has pointed to
Proud and its progeny as "an abundance of case law finding that when
the individual responsible for the alleged discriminatory act is the same
individual who hired or promoted plaintiff, there is insufficient evidence
of discriminatory intent."'5 6 Defendants have argued to the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits that discrimination is impossible as a matter of law when
there is hirer-firer identity.'57
While district courts have apparently not permitted such extreme
interpretations of the Proud principle, some published decisions suggest
the very real potential for further devolution of the "inference" into a
conclusive presumption of nondiscrimination, particularly in cases that
are not reviewed by appellate courts. For example, one district court has
held that hirer-firer identity creates "an assumption that age
discrimination was not the motive behind the termination."'58 Another
has interpreted the principle to mean that "the [McDonnell Douglas]
proof scheme does not apply where adverse action is taken against
154. See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 22, Waldron v.
SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-5282) (arguing that no justification for creating
formal inference existed "at least since Hicks, because the factfinder is free to draw whatever
reasonable inferences it chooses from the overall context of the evidence").
155. Id
156. Eslinger v. United States Cent. Credit Union, 866 F. Supp. 491, 498 (D. Kan. 1994)
(emphasis added). In light of other evidence presented, the court disagreed that the fact of promoter-
firer identity automatically made the plaintiff's claim irrational. Id. at 499.
157. Brief of Appellees/Cross-Plaintiffs at 21, Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621 (5th Cir.
1997) (No. 96-50419); Opening Brief of Appellants at 17, Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, 57
F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-1776 (L), 94-1802).
158. Walker v. Southern Holdings, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 197, 199 (M.D. La. 1996) (emphasis
added). An assumption is a fact that is conceded or taken for granted, independent of the
establishment of any basic fact. Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice &
Procedure: Federal Rules of Evidence § 5124 (1977).
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recently hired employees within the protected age group."15 9 Such
conclusory interpretations are inappropriate and should be curbed. "
6. The Principle as Expanded Discourages Legitimate Grievances
Perhaps the most disturbing consequence of the increased recognition
and use of the same actor rule is that it potentially discourages plaintiffs
with legitimate grievances from pursuing relief because of a perception
that any hirer-firer connection will destroy their case. The frequent
invocation of the Proud principle may already have had a chilling effect
on plaintiffs in the Fourth Circuit.'6' This outcome is not surprising in
light of the Proud court's stated intention to use the principle to reduce
the number of "meritless but costly" employment discrimination cases
brought to trial. 62 As the Stanford Law Review article on which the
Fourth Circuit relied in announcing the rule observed, "if discrimination
victims never sue, then employers have no economic incentive to
comply."'6" Such a consequence would seriously undermine federal anti-
discrimination legislation.
B. Alternately, the Same Actor Principle Should Be Restricted to Its
Original Parameters
The widespread adoption of the "same actor" doctrine has been
accompanied by unrelenting expansion of its initial boundaries,
seemingly unaccompanied by thoughtful consideration of the potential
consequences." 4 If the doctrine is invoked at all, its application should be
carefully limited. 6'
159. Gemmell v. Fairchild Space & Defense Corp., 813 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 n.3 (D. Md. 1993),
aff'd, 37 F.3d 1493 (4th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
160. Cf McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 356 (1995) (correcting some
circuit courts' use of evidence justifying employee dismissal acquired after-the-fact as conclusory
evidence that ADEA relief should be barred). The U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for
certiorari on the same actor issue in 1996. Buhrmaster v. Ovemite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461 (6th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 785 (1996).
161. The plaintiff's attorney in Proud indicated that such resignation is already occurring in the
Fourth Circuit. Telephone Interview with Michael L Kator, Of Counsel, Kator & Scott, Washington,
D.C. (Apr. 19, 1997) (observing that when opposing counsel on the defense side call him and tell
him they are citing Proud v. Stone, "I know it's over").
162. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796,798 (4th Cir. 1991).
163. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1023.
164. See supra Part II.
165. The Eighth Circuit could serve as a model of restraint. While surpassing the Fourth Circuit in
the number of published cases noting a hirer-firer link, see cases cited supra note 69, the court has
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1. The Same Actor Principle Should Be Raised Only in Age
Discrimination Situations
The same actor inference is particularly inapposite in gender, race, and
disability discrimination cases.'66 The hiring and firing factors for these
groups are arguably more complex than those for age-related decisions.
Pressures to hire a diverse workforce are more likely to be focused on
racial and gender differences than on age heterogeneity. 67 In addition,
race and gender biases may be more deeply ingrained than age-related
prejudices because the boundaries of race and gender are more apparent;
since everyone ultimately grows old, there is not a perceived "we-they"
detachment underlying and fueling prejudices. 6 A disability may not be
immediately apparent at the hiring stage, particularly in light of the
ADA's general prohibition of pre-employment inquiries concerning
disabilities; in such cases, the employer would not be aware of the
protected status at the time of hiring, thus rendering the doctrine
inapplicable. 69 Moreover, many disabilities may worsen over time,
requiring adjustments in an employer's statutory duty to accommodate
that do not exist with other protected groups. 7
limited the principle in several important respects: restricting it to ADEA cases, generally
considering the hirer-firer relationship only as a supplement to other evidence, and in one instance
declining to mention it despite criticism from the dissent. See Brown v. Stites Concrete, 994 F.2d
553, 568 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Loken, J., dissenting). Of nine published Eighth Circuit
decisions, four have been favorable to the employee, and five have been pro-employer. See cases
cited supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
166. For arguments that age discrimination differs from "classic" discrimination, see generally
Richard A. Posner, Aging & OldAge 358-63 (1995), and Samuel Issacharoff& Erica Worth Harris,
Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?: The ADEA 's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 780 (1997); see also Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 406 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.)
(expressing perplexity "that the middle-aged should be thought an oppressed minority requiring the
protection of federal law").
167. See, e.g., Reply Brief of the EEOC as Appellant at 17, EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection
Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2302) (distinguishing age and race contexts).
168. See Brief of the EEOC as Appellant at 21, Our Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr. (No. 95-
2302) (noting "the historic dimensions and depth of racial prejudice in American society").
169. See Susie v. Apple Tree Preschool & Child Care Ctr., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 390, 397 (N.D. Iowa
1994) (rejecting Tyndall's extension of inference to ADA claims).
170. Id (noting that such vicissitudes can "minimiz[e], if not eliminat[e], the force of the
inference of non-discrimination").
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2. The Same Actor Principle Should Be Raised Only When There Is
Personal Identity Between the Hirer and the Firer
Extension of the same actor inference to the employer in general, or to
groups of hiring officials, would virtually preclude all post-hire adverse
employment decisions, essentially eviscerating the entire anti-
discrimination framework. Thus, for example, an employer who hires a
woman and then later makes an adverse employment decision because
she does not fit impermissible gender stereotypes-circumstances found
to be discriminatory by the U.S. Supreme Court'---could merit a
presumption of nondiscrimination.'72 Defendants in several cases in
which the Court has found discrimination have pointed to past hiring of
individuals from the protected group as evidence of nondiscrimination."
The Court has declined to accord presumptive value to this information.
The circuits should follow suit.
3. The Same Actor Principle Should Be Raised Only When There Is a
Hire-Fire Interval of Less than One Year
Many circumstances can change over time that can give an employer
either a reason or an ability to discriminate. 74 In such circumstances, the
passage of time undermines the inferential value of any hirer-firer
connection. The maintenance of a "relatively short" hire-fire interval
would also align the doctrine more closely with the concept of a
traditional probation period. 75
171. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
172. For further discussion of stereotypical thinking, see generally Linda Hamilton Kreiger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995), and Federal Glass Ceiling Comm'n, Good for Business:
Making Full Use of the Nation's Human Capital (1995).
173. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (stating that, although
district court was entitled to consider workforce racial mix in determining motivation, such evidence
was insufficient to "conclusively" demonstrate that employer's actions were not motivated by
discrimination); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Buhrmaster v. Ovemite Transp. Co.,
61 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 785 (1996) (No. 95-6699) (noting that "[t]he
fact that ante-bellum plantation owners voluntarily utilized millions of black workers on their lands
obviously would not give rise to a 'strong inference' that no racial mistreatment occurred during the
era of chattel slavery").
174. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
175. See Peter B. Broida, A Guide to Merit Systems Protection Board Law & Practice ch. 1 (1997)
(discussing one-year probationary period for federal employees); Eng Seng Loh, Employment
Probation as a Sorting Mechanism, 47 Indus. & Labor Rel. Rev. 471 (1994) (quoting (Bureau of
Nat'l Affairs, Ind Rel. Guide: Seniority & Working Conditions 54,404 (1981) (finding that 90% of
union contracts contained probationary periods ranging from 30 days to six months)).
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4. The Same Actor Principle Should Be Restricted to Termination
Cases
The extension of the same actor principle to failure-to-promote
contexts is similarly flawed. Hiring a person from a disfavored group at a
lower level within the organization is significantly different from
selecting that individual for a higher-level position. The most obvious
example is the "glass ceiling" acknowledged for women. 7 6 Further, the
inference of nondiscrimination would automatically apply to any non-
hiring decision in a company or organization having only one
decisionmaker.'
5. The Same Actor Principle Should Not Be Accorded Mandatory
Presumptive Status
Since Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,'78 there has
been no question that the employee maintains the burden of persuasion in
an employment discrimination case. 7 9 However, reference to the hirer-
firer link as a "strong presumption" or "strong inference" rather than a
"reasonable inference" or "permissive presumption" can function to
make the plaintiff's burden more exacting than is either intended or
necessary. It is particularly inappropriate at the prima facie step, where
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the burden is not onerous. 80 At the
pretext stage, provided that the plaintiff has presented evidence to
discredit the defendant's justification, hirer-firer identity should be
granted no more weight than other evidence.' 8'
176. See generally Federal Glass Ceiling Comm'n, supra note 172. The Commission found that
although women comprise 40% of managers in large companies, they constitute fewer than 10% of
senior executive positions. Id. at 151. Less than 2% of senior-level male managers are African-
American, Asian, and Hispanic. l at 9; see also Lindemann & Grossman, supra note 8, at 35
(noting that plaintiffs faced with "same decisionmaker" inference might argue that employer willing
to hire persons in protected groups in entry-level jobs may discriminate in promotions "to preserve a
glass ceiling").
177. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 22, Buhrmaster (No. 95-6699) (stating that same actor
presumption would have practical effect of nullifying Congress's extensions of nondiscrimination
coverage to smaller firms).
178. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
179. Id. at253.
180. Id.
181. See Reply Brief of the EEOC as Appellant at 19, EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Med.
Ctr., 77 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2302); see also Brief of the EEOC as Appellant at 22, Our
Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr. (No. 95-2302) (arguing that "evidence of the same hirer/firer is
219
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6. The Same Actor Inference Should Not Be Invoked in the Summary
Judgment Context
Invoking an inference or permissive presumption in the summary
judgment context usurps the role of the jury and deprives the plaintiff of
a full opportunity to show why the "same actor inference" is
inappropriate in a particular case. At summary judgment, the court
should refrain from determining credibility, weighing evidence, or
drawing legitimate inferences from the facts, as those are jury
functions. 8 Evaluating whether the facts justify or rebut an inference or
presumption constitutes weighing evidence, a quintessential jury
function."8
Furthermore, summary judgment is not appropriate if a reasonable
trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party based on the record taken
as a whole."8 The "rationality" on which the Fourth Circuit based the
same actor inference is undermined by the fact that even seemingly
"rational" decisions may be based on impermissible (and often irrational)
prejudices. Thus, a reasonable trier of fact could find discrimination
despite hirer-firer identity. For the same reasons, the same actor
relationship should not be used to justify a judgment as a matter of law
unless the plaintiff has produced no prima facie case and/or evidence of
pretext from which a reasonable jury could find discrimination. A
realistic appreciation of the nature of prejudice, combined with
acknowledgment of patterns typical when discrimination has been found
in spite of hirer-firer identity, should prevent the court from prematurely
cutting off the presentation of evidence.
Finally, raising the same actor principle at summary judgment is
inappropriate because inferences are to be drawn in favor of the
nonmoving party."' Bringing up a "strong inference" against the
nonmoving party violates the spirit and the letter of summary judgment
procedure.
simply evidence like any other on the ultimate question of discrimination and should not be accorded
presumptive value").
182. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986).
183. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19, Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461
(6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 785 (1996) (No. 95-6699) (contending that "deciding what
factual inferences should be drawn from [hirer-firer] circumstances is a role conferred by the
Seventh Amendment on a jury").
184. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986).
185. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
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The inference should never suffice in itself to prove non-
discrimination. To allow it to do so would place inordinate weight on a
single piece of evidence, creating in effect a conclusive presumption.
Such treatment permits the court to dismiss a case without allowing the
plaintiff a full opportunity to show why the inference is not reasonable
given his or her specific circumstances. As the Supreme Court of Iowa
observed in declining to adopt the rule:
To apply such a wooden rule in an area where each case is factually
distinct would effectively grant every employer a grace period at
the beginning of each employee's tenure during which the
employer could freely discriminate with no fear of sanctions. This
we choose not to do. Questions of fact and credibility of witnesses
... are more properly answered by the jury, and as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, we will not set them aside.'86
IV. CONCLUSION
The "same actor inference" originated out of a stated concern for
expediting dismissal of meritless employment discrimination claims. Its
unrestricted application, however, can lead to dismissal of valid claims as
well. The most disturbing outcome of the doctrine's growing acceptance
is the potential for simultaneously encouraging employers to discriminate
without fear of repercussion while discouraging plaintiffs from bringing
valid claims. Courts invoking the inference should be aware of the
dangers inherent in its continuous expansion and apply it, if at all, with
caution.
186. Vaughan v. Must, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Iowa 1996).
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